



CyberFundamentals Framework

How the CyberFundamentals Framework can help to make Belgian companies more resilient to cyber attacks.

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1. Created by Royal Decree 10 October 2014

Contribute to build a safer and reliable internet

Create national policy and capabilities with existing actors

Under the authority of the Prime Minister

2. <u>NIS-law 7 April 2019 → Royal Decree 12 July 2019</u>

- National Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)
- National authority in charge of monitoring & coordinating the implementation of NIS



3. <u>Cybersecurity Certification-law 20 July 2022 & Royal Decree 16 October 2022</u> Designation of National Cybersecurity Certification Authority (NCCA) In charge of coordination, certification and supervision The implementation of the Cyber Security Act (CSA)





Legal mission of CCB as national authority for Cyber Security

- 1. Implementation of the Belgian Cyber Security Strategy & Policy
- 2. Centralized management of Belgian Cyber Security projects
- 3. Ensuring public, private and academic coordination
- 4. Adapting the **regulatory framework**
- 5. Ensuring crisis management
- 6. Implementation of guidelines and security standards for public institutions
- 7. Belgian representation in **international** cybersecurity forums
- 8. Security evaluation and certification
- 9. Informing and raising awareness



What is it?





What is it based on?





NIST CSF as a starting point – Why?

- Common and accessible language
- Adaptable to many technologies, lifecycle phases, sectors and uses
- Risk-based
- Based on international standards
- Living document
- Guided by many perspectives private sector, academia, public sector

NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0						
CSF 2.0 Function	CSF 2.0 Category	CSF 2.0 Category Identifier				
	Organizational Context	GV.OC				
Govern	Risk Management Strategy	GV.RM				
(GV)	Roles and Responsibilities	GV.RR				
	Policies and Procedures	GV.PO				
	Asset Management	ID.AM				
Identify	Risk Assessment	ID.RA				
(ID)	Supply Chain Risk Management	ID.SC				
	Improvement	ID.IM				
Protect (PR)	Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control	PR.AA				
	Awareness and Training	PR.AT				
	Data Security	PR.DS				
	Platform Security	PR.PS				
	Technology Infrastructure Resilience	PR.IR				
Detect	Adverse Event Analysis	DE.AE				
(DE)	Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM				
	Incident Management	RS.MA				
Respond	Incident Analysis	RS.AN				
(RS)	Incident Response Reporting and Communication	RS.CO				
	Incident Mitigation	RS.MI				
Recover	Incident Recovery Plan Execution	RC.RP				
(RC)	Incident Recovery Communication	RC.CO				





Core functions









TLP: GREEN

The CyFun architecture

Function	Catagony	Subcatogory		Basic	
Function	Category	Subcategory	Requirement	Guidance	Key Measure
TECT (PR)	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (PR.AC)	PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties	Access permissions for users to the organization's systems shall be defined and managed.	The following should be considered: Draw up and review regularly access lists per system (files, servers, software, databases, etc.), possibly through analysis of the Active Directory in Windows-based systems ()	Key Measure
				Important	
			Requirement	Guidance	Key Measure
			Where feasible, automated mechanisms shall be implemented to support the management of user accounts on ()	Consider separately identifying each person with access to the organization's critical systems with ()	
				Essential	
			Requirement	Guidance	Key Measure
			Account usage restrictions for specific time periods and locations shall be taken into account ()	Specific restrictions can include, for example, restricting usage ()	
				References per subcategory	
				CIS v8 Critical Security Control 3, 4,	



Key measures – the story behind





THERE ARE ONLY TWO TYPES OF ORGANISATIONS:

THOSE WHO DO SOMETHING **TO BE PREPARED** FOR RANSOMWARE **AND THOSE WHO JUST WAIT**



No misuse of risk assessments to do nothing \rightarrow just do it



Key measures – Figures

infoliicbb.belgium.be www.cbb.belgium.be



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Safeonweb





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IMPORTANT





ESSENTIAL



Its' measurable

Maturity level	Policy Maturity	Policy Score	Practice Maturity	Practice Score				
Initial (Level 1)	No Process documentation or not formally approv management	ed by	Standard process does not exist.					
Repeatable (Level 2)	Formally approved Process documentation exists be reviewed in the previous 2 years	out not	Ad-hoc process exists and is done informally.					
Defined (Level 3)	Formally approved Process documentation exists, a exceptions are documented and approved . Documented approved exceptions < 5% of the time	nd nented &	Formal process exists and is implemented. Evidence available for most activities. Less than 10% process exceptions.					
Managed (Level 4)	Formally approved Process documentation exists, a exceptions are documented and approved. Docum approved exceptions < 3% of the time	ind ented &	Formal process exists and is implemented. Evidence for all activities. Detailed metrics of the process are and reported. Minimal target for metrics has been established. Les process exceptions.	available e captured ss than 5% of				
Optimizing (Level 5)	Formally approved Process documentation exists, a exceptions are documented and approved. Docum approved exceptions < 0,5% of the time	ind ented &	Formal process exists and is implemented. Evidence available for all activities. Detailed metrics of the process are captured and reported. Minimal target for metrics has been established and continual improving . Less than 1% of process exceptions.					

Its' measurable and it can be act upon

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				2023		
	CyberFundamentals Categories	Target	Category	Policy Score	Practice Score	
	Overall	3,50	3,29	3,48	3,15	
	Asset Management (ID.AM)	3,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	
	Business Environment (ID.BE)	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	
·	Governance (ID.GV)	3,00	3,50	4,00	3,00	
	Risk Assessment (ID.RA)	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	
	Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM)	3,00	3,50	4,00	3,00	
	Supply Chain Risk Management (ID.SC)	3,00	3,50	3,00	4,00	
	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	
	Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	3,00	2,50	2,00	3,00	
•	Data Security (PR.DS)	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	
	Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP)	3,00	3,75	4,00	3,50	
	Maintenance (PR.MA)	3,00	3,50	4,00	3,00	
	Protective Technology (PR.PT)	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	
	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	3,00	2,50	2,00	3,00	
	Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)	3,00	4,00	5,00	3,00	
	Detection Processes (DE.DP)	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	
	Response Planning (RS.RP)	3,00	3,50	4,00	3,00	
	Communications (RS.CO)	3,00	4,00	4,00	4,00	
	Analysis (RS.AN)	3,00	2,50	3,00	2,00	
	Mitigation (RS.MI)	3,00	4,00	5,00	4,00	
	Improvements (RS.IM)	3,00	3,00	3,00	3,00	
	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)	3,00	3,50	4,00	3,00	
	Improvements (RC.IM)	3,00	4,00	4,00	4,00	
	Communications (RC.CO)	3,00	4,50	5,00	4,00	

Conformity assessment in the NIS2 directive

Essential entities	Important entities
Ex-ante + ex-post	Ex-post
On-site inspections 8	k off-site supervision
Targeted security audits	S based on risk assessments
Security	y scans
Request in	formation
Regular audits carried out by an independent body or a competent authority	
Request evidence of implementing Cyber Security policies	

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Assurance Level Verification: (under discussion with LAC)

	BASI	С	IMPORTANT	ESSENTIAL			
Type of assessment	Self-declaration Verification		Verification	Certification			
Assessment method	Self-assessment	Verification of self-assessment	Verification of self-assessment	Certification audit			
Assessment performed by	Internal auditor	Accredited CAB	Accredited CAB	Accredited CAB			
Frequency (3yrs repetitive cycle)	Yearly		Year 0: Complete Year 1 & 2: Partial				
Key Measures: # Each KM Maturity level	13 ≥ 2,5/5	13 ≥ 2,5/5	21 ≥ 3/5	29 ≥ 3/5			
Category : Each Category Maturity level	n/a	n/a	n/a	≥ 3/5			
Total Maturity level (average)	≥ 2,5/5	≥ 2,5/5	≥ 3/5	≥ 3,5/5			
Assurance evidence	None	Verified Claim	Verified Claim	Certificate			
Label *	None						
*: Label can also be obtained by ISO27001 certification by an accredited CAB - Presumption of equivalence - with the correct scope and SoA							

CyberFundamentals Framework Validation

Assurance Levels and requirements based on NIST CSF Profiles adapted to EU & BE Situation

- ☑ BASIC: SME profile
- ☑ IMPORTANT: basic for USA critical infrastructure
- ☑ ESSENTIAL: substantial for USA critical infrastructure

ANSSI – BASIC publication: (L'hygiène informatique en entreprise v0.1)

- ✓ 95% match with CCB CyberFundamentals Framework level BASIC
- ☑ 5% requirements are included at a higher assurance level of the CCB Framework

CERT attack Profiles (retrofit of successful attacks)

- \square 82% covered by requirements on level BASIC
- ☑ 12% covered by requirements on level IMPORTANT
- ☑ 6% covered by requirements on level ESSENTIAL

Implementation

CyberFundamentals Framework is publicly available (NL-FR-DE-EN) www.cyfun.be

Implementation

Energy			Common skills		Common skills		Common skills		Extended Skills		Extended Skills			
Organization Size (L/M/S = 3/2/1)	3	Threat Actor Type	Comp	Competitors		Ideologues Hactivists		Terrorist		Cyber Criminals		n State tor		
Cyber Attack Category	Global or Targetted	Impact	Prob	Risk Score	Prob	Risk Score	Prob	Risk Score	Prob	Risk Score	Prob	Risk Score		
Sabotage/ Disruption (DDOS,)	2	High	Low	0	Low	0	Med	30	Med	30	High	60		
Information Theft (espionage,)	2	High	Low	0	Low	0	Low	0	High	60	High	60		
Crime (Ransom attacks)	1	High	Low	0	Low	0	Low	0	High	30	Low	0		
Hactivism (Subversion, defacement)	1	Med	Low	0	Med	7,5	Low	0	Low	0	Med	7,5		
Disinformation (political influencing)	1	Low	Low	0	Med	0	Low	0	Low	0	Low	0	Score	CyFun Level
	Total	Total		0		7,5		30		120		127,5	285	ESSENTIAL

CyFun Selection tool (Risk Assessment)

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CyberFundamentals Framework mapping

CyberFundamentals Toolbox is **publicly available** (EN) → **www.cyfun.be**

CyFun Self-Assessment tool

Implementation

CCB is promoting the framework for mandatory and voluntary application.

CCB will set up **stakeholder consultation** to ensure continuing adequacy of the framework. CCB is open to **international collaboration** on the framework .

Questions?

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What does TLP Green mean?

TRAFFIC LIGHT PROTOCOL (TLP) Ref. <u>https://cert.be/en/traffic-light-protocol-tlp</u>

Green (TLP GREEN)

Limited disclosure, recipients can spread this within their community.

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